Comment
Sovereignty of Aves Island:
An Argument Against Standardized, Compulsory Arbitration
Introduction
Territorial boundaries, if well-established and recognized,
add stability to relations between neighbor states.1 Boundary
uncertainties, however, often lead to disputes which
significantly hamper state relations.2 While territorial boundary
disputes directly affect a state’s citizens,3 maritime boundary
disputes often affect economic relations between states.4 If
states’ claims of sovereignty of territory and resources located
therein conflict, disputes may quickly escalate unless states
employ means of dispute resolution.5
For example, Venezuela currently maintains a dispute over
the sovereignty of the Isla Aves (Bird Island) with various
Caribbean countries.6 Venezuela and Dominica, in particular,
claim sovereignty of the Island and the natural resources
located in its surrounding maritime territory.7 Since neither
Venezuela nor Dominica appears willing to compromise,8 the
increasing tension between the states may result in armed
conflict unless they engage in preemptive dispute resolution.9
States engaging in preemptive dispute resolution frequently
call upon adjudicative or diplomatic means to resolve
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territorial boundary disputes and comply with international
law.10 In light of reduced efficacy of such dispute resolution
mechanisms,11 however, some propose that all states should engage
in compulsory, standardized arbitration subject to International
Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”) review to resolve their boundary
disputes.12 Although arbitration is an effective method of
international dispute resolution in certain cases,13 standardized
arbitration will not effectively resolve all boundary disputes
between neighbor states.14
This Comment argues against the proposition that the United
Nations (“U.N.”) implement a standardized arbitration mechanism
and discusses implications of such a requirement on the current
dispute over the sovereignty of Aves Island.15 Part I first
presents Venezuela’s and Dominica’s claims of sovereignty of the
Island.16 Part I next highlights arbitration and mediation as
internationally accepted means of dispute resolution and
discusses the use of arbitration in Case Concerning East Timor
(“Portugal v. Australia”),17 and Case Concerning Land and
Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (“Cameroon v.
Nigeria”).18
Part II argues against a U.N. compulsory arbitration
requirement by first discussing its inconsistency with
Venezuela’s and Dominica’s sovereignty in light of Portugal v.
Australia.19 Part II next discusses Cameroon v. Nigeria to
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demonstrate that compulsory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review
will not effectively resolve the Aves Island dispute because the
I.C.J. is unable to enforce decisions.20 Part II also illustrates
how compulsory arbitration decreases the efficiency of
international dispute resolution in light of Cameroon v.
Nigeria.21
Part III recommends that the U.N. should not implement
compulsory, standardized arbitration but rather provide a forum
in which states engage in a combination of mediation and
arbitration (“Med-Arb”) to resolve their disputes.22 Part III
also recommends that Venezuela and Dominica, similar to the
parties in International Business Machines, Corp. v. Fujitsu,
Ltd. (“I.B.M. v. Fujitsu”), engage in Med-Arb to capitalize on
its advantages to resolve their dispute.23

Part IV then

concludes that all states should engage in Med-Arb in their
international boundary disputes to achieve effective redress in
the future.24
I. Background
Because the sovereignty of Aves Island has significant
economic implications for both Venezuela and Dominica, both
states claim sovereignty of the Island and the resources located
in its surrounding maritime territory.25 To prevent disputing
states such as Venezuela and Dominica from resorting to force to
settle their dispute, the U.N. provides diplomatic and
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adjudicative means of dispute resolution which states may employ
to peacefully resolve their disputes.26 Portugal v. Australia
demonstrates that dispute settlement requires state consent.27
Cameroon v. Nigeria highlights the inefficacy of dispute
settlement where non-consenting states fail to recognize and
comply with settlement awards.28 Finally, I.B.M. v. Fujitsu
indicates that consensual dispute settlement may increase the
efficacy and efficiency of dispute resolution.29
A. Venezuela and Dominica Have Conflicting Claims of
Sovereignty of Aves Island and the Resources
Located in its Surrounding Maritime Territory
Venezuela recently reaffirmed its claim of sovereignty of
Aves Island.30 Dominica and various Caribbean countries, however,
object to Venezuela’s increased show of authority over the
Island and may seek resolution of the long-standing dispute
through maritime dispute resolution mechanisms.31 Aves Island,
located approximately 350 nautical miles (“nm”) northeast of
Venezuela and 140 nm southwest of Dominica,32 is famous for its
spectacular birds and endangered sea turtles.33 More importantly,
the Island is surrounded by maritime territory with significant
natural resources.34 Because the natural resources comprise
approximately twenty percent of the world’s natural gas
reserves, the dispute has significant economic implications for
the international community.35
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1. Venezuela Claims Sovereignty of Aves
Island Based on Historic Title
Venezuela claims that its historic title and sovereignty of
the Island dates to the nineteenth century.36 Although other
countries claimed sovereignty of the Island during the past two
centuries,37 Venezuela consistently exercised authority over the
Island during the end of the twentieth and beginning of the
twenty-first centuries.38 Venezuela also claims sovereignty of
the maritime territory surrounding the Island that extends
approximately 335 nm north of its coastal baselines.39 Lastly,
though Venezuela has not yet ratified the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”),40 Venezuela claims that its
sovereignty of Aves Island grants it rightful access to any
territorial waters, exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), and
continental shelf under UNCLOS’ provisions.41
2. Dominica Claims Sovereignty of Aves Island Because
it Lies Within Dominica’s Exclusive Economic Zone
In contrast, Dominica and other Caribbean countries claim
that Dominica has sovereignty of Aves Island under the
provisions of UNCLOS and object to Venezuela’s increasing show
of authority over the Island.42 Dominica asserts that its claim
to Aves Island is stronger than that of Venezuela’s because the
Island, located within 140 nm of Dominica’s coastal baselines,
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falls within its EEZ under UNCLOS.43 Dominica also objects to
Venezuela’s claim of sovereignty of the maritime territory that
surrounds Aves Island because it apportions significant maritime
territory away from Dominica and other Caribbean Islands.44
B. Venezuela and Dominica May Resolve Their Dispute over
the Sovereignty of Aves Island Through Internationally
Accepted Means of Dispute Resolution
Dispute resolution mechanisms allow states to settle
disputes without employing force.45 The U.N., in fact, even
obligates member states to attempt peaceful resolution of
disputes.46 The U.N. Charter identifies eight acceptable methods
of dispute resolution which are either adjudicative or
diplomatic in nature.47 Whether states engage in adjudicative or
diplomatic means to resolve their disputes,48 all such mechanisms
rely on states’ consent for dispute settlement.49
1. Arbitration as an Adjudicative
Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Adjudicative means of dispute resolution require governing
bodies to apply precedent and customary international law when
resolving disputes between states.50 States employing
adjudicative means of dispute resolution may elect formal, incourt adjudication or arbitration by temporary arbitral
tribunals.51 States often prefer international arbitration over
adjudication to resolve their disputes because arbitration
ideally offers more efficiency and expediency than that offered
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by adjudication.52 After states consent to arbitration,53 they
compose a set of rules and procedures for the arbitral tribunal
to follow during arbitration.54 The tribunal then issues an award
that is binding on the parties.55
2. Mediation as a Diplomatic Dispute Resolution
Mechanism and Alternative to Arbitration
Mediation, a diplomatic method of dispute resolution,
offers states an opportunity to resolve their dispute through
negotiations mediated by a neutral third-party.56 States engage
in diplomatic means of dispute resolution, mediation in
particular, to reconcile their interests and reach a consensual
agreement.57 Mediation is an advantageous method of dispute
resolution because it grants states significant autonomy and
flexibility during the resolution process,58 results in an
impartial award by third-party mediators,59 and is even more
efficient than arbitration.60
C. Portugal’s and Australia’s Dispute over
East Timor Demonstrates that Dispute
Settlement Requires State Consent
1. Framing Portugal’s and Australia’s Historical
Claims of Sovereignty of East Timor
Although the Democratic Republic of East Timor is now
independent, its sovereignty has been disputed since the
sixteenth century.61 While both Portugal and Holland exercised
sovereignty over East Timor between the sixteenth and twentieth
centuries, East Timor unilaterally declared its independence
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from Portugal in 1975.62 A dispute between Portugal and Australia
arose in 1991 when Portugal alleged that Australia engaged in
actions which failed to respect Portugal as East Timor’s
administering power.63 Australia, in contrast, contended that the
East Timorese granted it international responsibility for
Timor.64
2. Portugal v. Australia Implicates a
Third State Which Did Not Consent
to I.C.J. Adjudication
Portugal initiated proceedings against Australia because
Australia failed to recognize Portugal’s sovereignty of East
Timor prior to 1991.65 Both states consented to arbitration by
the I.C.J.,66 but Australia objected to arbitration without
Indonesia’s consent as an interested third-party.67 The I.C.J.
decided that Indonesia’s actions with regard to East Timor
directly influenced the Court’s determination of whether
Australia acted lawfully with respect to East Timor.68 Because
Indonesia did not consent to arbitration, the I.C.J. lacked
jurisdiction over the dispute and could not rule without
undermining Indonesia’s sovereign right to consent to
arbitration.69
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D. Nigeria Fails to Comply with the Decision
of the I.C.J. in Cameroon v. Nigeria
1. Framing Cameroon’s Dispute over the
Bakassi Peninsula with Nigeria
Cameroon’s border dispute with Nigeria, centering on the
sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula and maritime territory
surrounding Lake Chad,70 stemmed from ambiguous demarcation of
German territory in Western Africa after World War One.71 Before
tension over the border dispute escalated to armed conflict,72
however, Cameroon submitted the dispute to the I.C.J for binding
demarcation of the peninsula and the maritime area surrounding
Lake Chad.73
2. The I.C.J. Is Unable to Enforce
Its Award in Cameroon v. Nigeria
Cameroon submitted its boundary dispute with Nigeria to the
I.C.J. for binding adjudication in 1994.74 Both Cameroon and
Nigeria claimed that they inherited title to the Bakassi
Peninsula through the concept of uti possidetis juris when they
became independent states.75 Under this concept, disputing states
such as Cameroon and Nigeria inherit their colonial borders when
they become independent.76 In its 2002 decision the I.C.J.
granted Cameroon sovereignty of Bakassi Peninsula and a large
portion of the maritime territory surrounding Lake Chad.77
Although the award supposedly had binding force, however,
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Nigeria did not initially recognize the decision and has yet to
legitimize or comply with the I.C.J.’s order to withdraw from
Bakassi.78
E. I.B.M. and Fujitsu Use a Combination of
Mediation and Arbitration to Resolve
Their Landmark Dispute
In I.B.M. v. Fujitsu, a landmark copyright infringement
case, I.B.M. and Fujitsu engaged in a combination of mediation
and arbitration to resolve their dispute.79 Employing Med-Arb
allowed the arbitrators to capitalize on the advantages of both
mediation and arbitration to facilitate an efficient settlement
process.80 Med-Arb consists of two distinct stages.81 In the first
stage of Med-Arb, mediators attempt to facilitate agreement
between the parties by directing negotiations.82 If disputing
parties fail to reach an agreement through mediation, however,
the same third-party mediator then arbitrates the dispute.83 In
Med-Arb, the arbiter has traditional arbitral duties and
eventually issues a decision that has binding force on the
parties.84
II. Analysis
The U.N. should not require arbitration of all boundary
disputes because it violates state sovereignty embodied in
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter.85 First, compulsory arbitration
violates the sovereignty of disputing states such as Venezuela
and Dominica because it eliminates their right to consent to
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dispute resolution and to self-determination.86 Second,
compulsory arbitration will not resolve boundary disputes
effectively because it results in settlement noncompliance and
creates international enforcement issues.87 Lastly, compulsory
arbitration creates inefficiencies in dispute settlement because
it eliminates the opportunity for states such as Venezuela and
Dominica to resolve their dispute through bilateral negotiations
or other regional settlement mechanisms.88
A. Requiring Venezuela and Dominica to Arbitrate
Their Dispute with Regard to Aves Island
Violates Their Sovereignty Under
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter
The U.N.’s implementation of compulsory, standardized
arbitration violates Venezuela’s and Dominica’s state
sovereignty for two reasons.89 First, compulsory arbitration
violates Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which grants disputing
states such as Venezuela and Dominica sovereign equality.90
Second, Portugal v. Australia demonstrates that Venezuela’s and
Dominica’s sovereignty encompasses the right to consent to the
resolution of their dispute over Aves Island.91 Finally,
compulsory arbitration is inconsistent with the U.N.’s grant to
member states of self-determination in Article 55, which grants
them the sovereign right to choose a method of dispute
resolution from the range of internationally accepted means.92

11

1. Compulsory Arbitration Violates Venezuela’s and
Dominica’s Sovereignty Under Article 2 of the
U.N. Charter
Implementing a requirement that states engage in
arbitration directly conflicts with the right of sovereignty
granted to states by Article 2 of the U.N. Charter.93 This
article, granting sovereign equality to all member states of the
U.N.,94 vests states with the sovereign right to use, dispose of,
and prevent unauthorized access to their territory by other
states.95 More broadly, this sovereign right empowers states to
act in manners reasonably necessary to further state interests
and those of their citizens.96
Not surprisingly, the Aves Island dispute affects both
Venezuela’s and Dominica’s state sovereignty.97 When they
ratified the U.N. Charter and became member states, Venezuela
and Dominica received sovereign equality as member states under
Article 2.98 Thus the U.N. Charter grants Venezuela and Dominica,
as sovereign states, the right to take action and protect their
state interests and the best interests of their citizens.99
Compulsory arbitration violates Venezuela’s and Dominica’s state
sovereignty under Article 2 of the U.N. Charter because it
denies their right to political and economic independence.100

12

2. Portugal v. Australia Demonstrates that Compulsory
Arbitration is Inconsistent with Venezuela’s and
Dominica’s Sovereignty Because it Dispenses with
Their Right to Consent to Resolution
of Their Dispute
Venezuela and Dominica have a sovereign right to consent to
settlement of their dispute over Aves Island.101 In Portugal v.
Australia, for example, the I.C.J. found that it could not
decide a dispute that involved a non-consenting state party.102
With regard to Aves Island, both Venezuela and Dominica may
refer to the I.C.J.’s rationale in Portugal v. Australia and
argue that a requirement of compulsory arbitration will
undermine their sovereign right to consent to the resolution of
their dispute.103 This argument is especially persuasive in the
case of Venezuela because it has not yet ratified UNCLOS.104 This
demonstrates that Venezuela does not desire to be bound by
mandatory arbitration in its international disputes.105 As such,
compulsory arbitration will violate Venezuela’s and Dominica’s
sovereign right to consent to the resolution of their dispute
over Aves Island.106
3. Compulsory Arbitration Violates Article 55
of the U.N. Charter Which Grants Member
States the Right to Self-Determination
As U.N. member states, both Venezuela and Dominica have the
right to self-determination under Article 55 of the U.N.
Charter.107 Because self-determination encompasses the sovereign
right to consent to dispute settlement, compulsory arbitration
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violates Venezuela’s and Dominica’s right under Article 55 to
consent to the resolution of their dispute over Aves Island.108
Additionally, Article 55 specifically indicates that member
states enjoy self-determination with regard to economic and
social conditions and development.109 Thus Venezuela and
Dominica, under this article, have the right to take action and
protect both the stability of their economic, inter-state
relations and their individual state interests.110
Applying Article 55 of the U.N. Charter to the Aves Island
dispute, Venezuela and Dominica justifiably may seek to exercise
their sovereign right to self-determination with regard to their
dispute.111 Aves Island itself, for example, will provide both
states with a significant source of additional income from its
increasing tourism activities.112 More importantly, however,
sovereignty of the Island may grant either state control over
its coastal baselines under UNCLOS Articles 3, 57, and 76.113
Under these provisions, for example, Dominica or Venezuela
may obtain exclusive rights to exploit the vast natural gas
reserves located within the maritime territory surrounding the
Island.114 Dominica, in particular, has a strong claim to
sovereignty of Aves Island and the available natural resources
because the Island is located within Dominica’s EEZ under UNCLOS
Article 57.115 Because both states have significant interests in
Aves Island and the resources in its surrounding maritime
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territory, compulsory arbitration violates their sovereign right
to consent to resolution in a manner that best protects their
state interests and those of their citizens.116
4. Portugal v. Australia Supports the Right of
Venezuela and Dominica to Self-Determination
of Their Dispute
Entitled to self-determination under Article 55 of the U.N.
Charter, Venezuela and Dominica have a sovereign right to select
an acceptable method of dispute resolution from those enumerated
in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.117 The I.C.J. supported the
sovereign right of states to self-determination in Portugal v.
Australia.118 In that case, the I.C.J. noted that selfdetermination vested all states interested in East Timor with
the right to protect their sovereignty of disputed resources.119
Applying Article 55 and the I.C.J.’s rationale in Portugal
v. Australia to the instant dispute, Venezuela and Dominica are
similarly entitled to choose an acceptable method of dispute
resolution.120 Consistent with the I.C.J.’s ruling in Portugal v.
Australia, Venezuela and Dominica may select a means of dispute
settlement that best protects their state interests and those of
their citizens with regard to Aves Island and the resources in
its surrounding maritime territory.121 Because compulsory
arbitration denies Venezuela and Dominica their right to select
optimal dispute resolution methods, both states will lose
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autonomy to select means of settlement and procedures that best
protect their state interests and those of their citizens.122
When exercising its right under Article 55 of the U.N.
Charter to self-determination, Venezuela may want to engage in
mediation with Dominica as the most effective method of dispute
settlement.123 As a larger, more economically powerful state,124
Venezuela could apply political and economic pressures to
Dominica during bilateral negotiations where it could not in the
more formalized procedures of arbitration or adjudication.125
This, in turn, may coerce Dominica into premature or unnecessary
compromise; thereby saving Venezuela the burden and additional
costs of formal arbitration or adjudication.126
Dominica, in contrast, may rely on the I.C.J.’s rationale
in Portugal v. Australia and consider formal arbitration or
adjudication to be the best dispute resolution method to protect
its interests in Aves Island and the resources in the Island’s
surrounding maritime territory.127 Such formal procedures may
provide a higher guarantee of impartiality and equality in any
award.128 Additionally, because Dominica is not as economically
powerful, it may want to stipulate specific conditions and
procedures of settlement.129 By denying Venezuela and Dominica an
opportunity to select the procedures of their settlement,
compulsory arbitration not only undermines dispute resolution’s
intended flexibility but violates their right to self-
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determination under Article 55 of the U.N. Charter and the
rationale of the I.C.J. in Portugal v. Australia.130
B. Compulsory Arbitration Subject to I.C.J. Review Will
Not Resolve the Aves Island Dispute Because the I.C.J. is
Unable to Enforce Decisions Against Non-Consenting States
The U.N. requirement that all states engage in compulsory,
standardized arbitration subject to I.C.J. review is
unpersuasive for two reasons.131 First, Cameroon v. Nigeria
demonstrates that disputing states such as Venezuela and
Dominica may not cooperate during settlement or comply with an
arbitral award where they do not originally consent to the
resolution of their dispute.132 Second, although Article 94 of
the U.N. Charter provides the U.N. Security Council with the
capability to enforce I.C.J. decisions, I.C.J. decisions are
effectively unenforceable unless disputes rise to a level that
endangers international peace and security.133
1. Compulsory Arbitration Reduces the Likelihood for
Compliance with an Arbitral Award Where Either
Venezuela or Dominica Withholds Consent to
Settlement of Their Dispute
Effective resolution of international boundary disputes
requires states such as Venezuela and Dominica to cooperate
during settlement through recognition and compliance with any
resulting award.134 Articles 2 and 33 of the U.N. Charter, in
fact, obligate U.N. member states to attempt peaceful resolution
of their disputes in good faith.135 Venezuela’s and Dominica’s
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cooperation in resolving their dispute over Aves Island is
especially important because the dispute affects the allocation
of vast amounts of economic resources located in the maritime
territory surrounding the Island.136 Subjecting the dispute to
compulsory arbitration, however, falsely assumes that both
Venezuela and Dominica will cooperate during dispute settlement
and then recognize and comply with any resulting arbitral
award.137
In Cameroon v. Nigeria, for example, Nigeria did not comply
initially with the I.C.J.’s award of Bakassi Peninsula to
Cameroon because it considered the decision of the I.C.J.
invalid where Nigeria withheld its consent to dispute
settlement.138 Similarly, if either Venezuela or Dominica is
predisposed to withhold consent to the settlement of their
dispute, then it is unlikely that they will cooperate during
settlement or comply with an award because they may not consider
the settlement or its award legitimate.139
Venezuela, for example, demonstrated its lack of consent to
be bound by compulsory dispute settlement when it failed to
ratify the provisions of UNCLOS.140 If the I.C.J. determines that
Venezuela is the losing state then it may oblige Venezuela to
implement an unfavorable judgment as it obliged Nigeria in
Cameroon v. Nigeria.141 Venezuela, however, is unlikely to comply
with an unfavorable decision where it specifically has not
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consented to dispute settlement.142 Therefore, compulsory
arbitration will not resolve Venezuela’s dispute with Dominica
over Aves Island where either party withholds consent and then
fails to comply with an arbitral award.143
2. The I.C.J. Lacks Capability to Enforce an Award
if Either Venezuela or Dominica Fail to
Comply with Compulsory Arbitration
Compulsory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review will not
resolve the Aves Island dispute because the I.C.J. lacks
enforcement capability over Venezuela and Dominica.144 Cameroon
v. Nigeria demonstrates that international bodies are unable to
enforce decisions.145 After the I.C.J. issued an unfavorable
ruling against Nigeria, Cameroon had the ability under Article
94 of the U.N. Charter to seek enforcement of the award through
the U.N. Security Council.146 Unlike Cameroon v. Nigeria, where
both states previously accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the I.C.J., neither Venezuela nor Dominica have consented to the
I.C.J.’s compulsory jurisdiction.147 Because the I.C.J. may only
entertain disputes in which states consent to its jurisdiction,
compulsory arbitration will result in an innocuous and
unenforceable award.148
Even if Venezuela and Dominica accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J., however, international law lacks
effective remedies for noncompliance with arbitral awards.149 In
that instance, for example, either state may seek judicial
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enforcement of an arbitral decision under Article 94 of the U.N.
Charter.150 As demonstrated in Cameroon v. Nigeria, however,
Article 94 offers disputing states ineffective remedies.151
Though its language is vague, Article 94 expressly empowers the
Security Council to recommend action to resolve the dispute.152
Additionally, although Article 94 of the U.N. Charter
empowers the U.N. Security Council to intervene and enforce
I.C.J. decisions through imposing economic and political
sanctions and using force, the Security Council is unlikely to
intervene in the instant dispute unless the conflict rises to a
level that endangers international peace and security.153 Even if
the Security Council intervenes, Venezuela could withstand
economic and political pressure because of its status as an
economically powerful state.154 Intervention might affect
Dominica if deemed the losing state; however, Dominica also may
withstand economic pressure by relying on resources from other
members in the Caribbean Community.155 Because the U.N. Security
Council’s enforcement capability will likely have limited effect
on the Aves Island dispute, compulsory arbitration thus fails to
effectively resolve the dispute between Venezuela and
Dominica.156
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C. Compulsory Arbitration Subject to I.C.J. Review
Creates Inefficiency for the I.C.J. and for
Disputing States Such as Venezuela and Dominica
Requiring states to engage in standardized arbitration
under I.C.J. review is an inefficient process of dispute
resolution.157 First, mandatory arbitration subject to I.C.J.
review creates inefficiencies in the hierarchy of dispute
resolution bodies set forth in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.158
Second, Cameroon v. Nigeria demonstrates that compulsory
arbitration also deprives disputing states such as Venezuela and
Dominica the efficiencies of engaging in bilateral negotiations
or regional dispute settlement mechanisms.159
1. Compulsory Arbitration Bypasses Preliminary
Diplomatic Dispute Settlement Procedures
Embodied in the U.N. Charter
Though proposed to make international dispute resolution
more efficient, mandatory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review
in fact decreases its efficiency.160 Under Article 33 of the U.N.
Charter, the U.N. set forth a hierarchy of settlement methods
from which states should choose to resolve their disputes.161 By
first referencing negotiation, mediation, and conciliation in
its list of acceptable means of dispute settlement, Article 33
indicates that states engaging in such preliminary bilateral
procedures add to the administrative efficiency of the hierarchy
of international dispute resolution.162
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Compulsory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review, for
instance, eliminates the opportunity for Venezuela and Dominica
to negotiate bilaterally by mandating initial arbitration of the
Aves Island dispute before the I.C.J.163 Even if bilateral
negotiations between Venezuela and Dominica fail, compulsory
arbitration will deprive them an opportunity to settle
regionally before mechanisms such as the Permanent Council of
the Organization of the American States as well.164 By
eliminating these opportunities, compulsory arbitration
decreases the efficiency of the dispute resolution hierarchy
embodied in Article 33 by requiring all disputes be reviewed at
the I.C.J. level.165
2. Compulsory Arbitration Deprives Disputing States
Such as Venezuela and Dominica the Efficiencies
of Engaging in Bilateral Settlement Procedures
Implementing compulsory arbitration not only decreases
administrative efficiency of international dispute resolution,
but deprives disputing states such as Venezuela and Dominica the
efficiencies of bilateral settlement procedures as well.166 In
Cameroon v. Nigeria, the I.C.J. noted that “regional agencies,”
geared towards the resolution of geographically specific
disputes, are often the appropriate settlement mechanism for
territorial boundary disputes.167 In addition, Article 52 of the
U.N. Charter emphasizes the efficiency of regional settlement
mechanisms.168 This emphasis indicates that regional settlement
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mechanisms may offer Venezuela and Dominica efficiencies that
standard adjudication or arbitration lack.169
For example, regional settlement might offer Venezuela and
Dominica the benefits of local expertise with regard to regional
law, customs, and agreements.170 Regional experts, in consensus
with regard to local law, add predictability and transparency to
awards from regional settlement mechanisms while shortening the
time necessary for dispute resolution.171 Thus, mandatory
arbitration will deprive Venezuela and Dominica the efficiencies
of lower costs, faster results, and access to justice that
regional mechanisms offer.172
III. Recommendations
By providing a forum for states to engage in Med-Arb when
resolving their disputes, the U.N. may foster a more effective
and efficient means of dispute resolution than that offered
through compulsory, standardized arbitration.173 First, Med-Arb
is an effective means of dispute resolution for disputing states
such as Venezuela and Dominica because it encourages state
cooperation in dispute settlement and compliance with settlement
awards.174 Second, Med-Arb adds efficiency to the dispute
resolution process by providing states such as Venezuela and
Dominica with the advantages of both mediation and arbitration
in their dispute settlement.175
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A. Venezuela and Dominica Should Engage in Med-Arb Because
it Will Make Their Settlement Processes More Effective
By engaging in Med-Arb, Venezuela and Dominica could add
efficacy to settlement procedures and results with regard to
their dispute over Aves Island.176 In recognizing Venezuela’s and
Dominica’s sovereign right to consent to resolution of their
dispute, Med-Arb will make their dispute resolution process more
effective by encouraging both states to cooperate and attempt
resolution of the Aves Island dispute in good faith.177 Second,
because Med-Arb increases the likelihood that states reach
settlement, it will add efficacy to Venezuela’s and Dominica’s
dispute resolution by encouraging settlement compliance and
curing any potential enforcement issues with regard to their
dispute.178
1. Med-Arb Will Increase the Effectiveness of Dispute
Settlement by Encouraging Both Venezuela and
Dominica to Cooperate During Settlement and
Make Good-Faith Attempts at Dispute Resolution
Venezuela and Dominica can increase the effectiveness of
their dispute resolution process through using Med-Arb in their
settlement.179 Med-Arb, unlike compulsory arbitration, is based
upon the consent of disputing parties to resolve their
dispute.180 The parties in I.B.M. v. Fujitsu, for example,
established consent to the processes of Med-Arb in their initial
meetings.181 This consensus allowed the parties to establish a
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framework agreement that encompassed the development of the
processes of Med-Arb and each party’s obligations.182
Similarly, Venezuela and Dominica should undergo Med-Arb
in their dispute over Aves Island to increase the effectiveness
of their dispute settlement.183 For example, establishing a
framework agreement that defines the development of their
settlement and its processes will clarify and offer direction to
both Venezuela and Dominica with regard to their obligations
during settlement.184 In addition, Venezuela and Dominica are
more likely to cooperate with procedures and honor obligations
that they agree to in a framework agreement.185
2. Med-Arb Encourages Compliance with Settlement
and Cures Enforcement Issues
Med-Arb may also increase the effectiveness of settlement
of the Aves Island dispute because Med-Arb encourages compliance
with awards.186 As I.B.M. v. Fujitsu demonstrates, parties are
more likely to recognize and comply with Med-Arb awards because
they stem from consensual negotiations during the mediation
phase of Med-Arb mediation phase.187 If Venezuela and Dominica
agree to engage in Med-Arb to settle their dispute, they,
similarly, are likely to recognize any resulting award because
they initially consented to Med-Arb and its procedures.188
I.B.M. v. Fujitsu also demonstrates that Med-Arb encourages
mutually favorable agreements by allowing disputing parties such
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as Venezuela and Dominica to choose resolution procedures
autonomously.189 Where Venezuela and Dominica autonomously set
Med-Arb procedures and guidelines, they are more likely to
comply because they previously consented to Med-Arb’s
processes.190 Even if Venezuela and Dominica fail to reach
complete agreement during the initial mediation phase, they may
agree to a binding award issued during Med-Arb’s arbitration
phase.191 Further, Venezuela and Dominica may draft enforcement
clauses that offer either party various forums in which to
enforce the award.192 Thus since Venezuela and Dominica will have
more autonomy during Med-Arb, they are more likely to comply
with its result.193
B. Venezuela and Dominica Should Engage in Med-Arb Because
it Adds Efficiency to Their Dispute Resolution Process
Med-Arb increases the efficiency of Venezuela’s and
Dominica’s dispute resolution because it allows them to
capitalize on the advantages of both mediation and arbitration
to resolve their dispute.194 Med-Arb affords disputing states
such as Dominica and Venezuela various procedural
efficiencies.195 After the arbiters in IBM v. Fujitsu attempted
dispute resolution through various unstructured processes, they
then streamlined their dispute resolution process by employing a
two step Med-Arb process that conserved resources.196
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Venezuela and Dominica, similarly, may profit procedurally
by conserving resources if they engage in Med-Arb.197 For
example, if Venezuela and Dominica reach an agreement with
regard to the parties’ relationship during the initial mediation
phase, the arbiters will save resources typically required to
determine allocations of fault in the dispute.198 Med-Arb also
allows disputing states such as Venezuela and Dominica to
resolve preliminary issues in its mediation phase and thus
reduce the number of outstanding issues subject to arbitration
in the subsequent arbitration phase.199 If Venezuela and Dominica
fail to reach a complete agreement in the initial mediation
phase of Med-Arb, however, their third-party mediator will
transition into the role of a third-party arbiter equipped with
standard arbiter duties and enforcement abilities.200
As I.B.M. v. Fujitsu demonstrates, this role change will
likely increase the efficiency of Venezuela’s and Dominica’s
dispute settlement because the arbiters may focus on the states’
core interests and settlement goals instead of their rights.201
In addition, third-party arbiters may eliminate discovery in
fact-intensive disputes such as that over Aves Island because
they are already familiar with the dispute and its facts.202
Because it allows the arbiters to save time and discovery
expenses, Med-Arb thus affords disputing states such as
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Venezuela and Dominica procedural efficiencies that compulsory
arbitration may lack.203
Conclusion
States contribute to international peace and security by
resolving their disputes through accepted means of dispute
resolution.204 States are entitled to select from a myriad of
accepted dispute settlement mechanisms to resolve their
disputes.205 A requirement that disputing states such as
Venezuela and Dominica engage in arbitration is ineffective
because it undermines state sovereignty by dispensing with their
right to consent to submit the dispute for resolution and
requires states to be bound by its processes and procedures.206
If the U.N. subjects the Aves Island dispute to compulsory
arbitration, it will encourage settlement noncompliance, extend
U.N. Security Council inabilities to enforce noncompliance, and
foster inefficiencies in the settlement of Venezuela’s and
Dominica’s border dispute.207 Instead, Venezuela and Dominica
should engage in a combination of mediation and arbitration to
resolve their dispute.208 Engaging in Med-Arb will allow
Venezuela and Dominica to maximize the efficacy and efficiency
of their dispute resolution process.209 By engaging in Med-Arb,
Venezuela and Dominica may reach a mutually beneficial
agreement, further international peace and security for all
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states affected, and set a precedent for diplomatic resolution
of disputes in the near future.210
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86

See discussion infra Parts II.A.2, II.A.3, II.A.4 (claiming

that state sovereignty encompasses the right to consent to
dispute resolution and to self-determination).
87

See discussion infra Part II.B (reasoning that compulsory

arbitration will result in settlement noncompliance by states
which withhold initial consent dispute resolution and suggesting
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such noncompliance makes compulsory arbitration innocuous due to
weak international enforcement capabilities).
88

See discussion infra Part II.C (arguing that arbitration will

not maximize the efficiencies of dispute resolution under
Article 33 of the U.N. Charter).
89

See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (conceding that compulsory

arbitration is, in fact, vulnerable to criticisms of violating
state sovereignty).
90

See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (noting the founders of the

U.N. organized the U.N. based on the “sovereign equality of all
its members”).
91

See, e.g., East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para.

34 (June 30) (referencing the international standard that the
I.C.J. cannot exercise jurisdiction over states without their
sovereign consent); Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 126 (Feb. 3)
(emphasizing that although states may imply consent to I.C.J.
adjudication in certain circumstances, the I.C.J.’s basis for
entertaining jurisdiction must stem from state consent according
to its statute); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 87 (Mar.
16) (failing to rule on the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain
where Britain did not consent to I.C.J. adjudication and where
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the dispute affected Britain’s interests); Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
27) (conveying that the necessity of state consent to
international adjudication predated the establishment of the
I.C.J.).
92

See U.N. Charter art. 55 (basing the right to self-

determination on the need for peaceful and friendly relations
between all states). Article 56 obliges all U.N. members to
recognize the right of states to self-determination under
Article 55. Id. art. 56.
93

See id. art. 2, para. 7 (stating that the “U.N. may not

intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or . . . require [its] members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present charter . .
. .”). Thus compulsory arbitration undermines the sovereign
right of U.N. members such as Venezuela and Dominica their
territorial and political independence. Id. arts. 1, 4.
94

See id. art. 2 (indicating that states should use their

equality to pursue the U.N.’s purposes set forth in Article 1);
see also id. art. 1 (proclaiming that states should cooperate to
solve international problems that are “economic, social,
cultural, [and] humanitarian in character. . . .”); Cassese,
supra note 2, at 88 (distinguishing sovereign equality of states
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from states’ legal equality and noting that sovereign equality
serves as the basis for international law).
95

See Cassese, supra note 2, at 89-90 (mentioning that state

sovereignty also encompasses the right to exercise authority
over individuals that live within a state’s territory, immunity
for sovereign state actions in the jurisdiction of foreign
courts, and immunity for official actions performed by state
representatives).
96

See id. at 89 (correlating a state’s right to protect the best

interests of its citizens with a duty to promote state security
within its territory).
97

See Daily Journal, supra note 8 (reporting the Aves Island

dispute significantly affects Venezuela’s and Dominica’s
maritime boundaries and their right to exercise control over the
resources located in the Island’s surrounding maritime
territory).
98

Press Release, United Nations, United Nations Member States,

U.N. Doc. ORG/1360/Rev.1

(Oct. 2, 2004) (recounting that

Venezuela joined the U.N. on Nov. 15, 1945 and Dominica joined
the U.N. on Dec. 18, 1978), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/ORG1360.rev.1.doc.htm
(last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
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99

See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (granting U.N. member states

the right to act to protect their “territorial integrity [and]
political independence . . . .”).
100

See id. (mandating that no state deprive U.N. member states

their right to protect state interests and those of their
citizens).
101

C.f. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 34

(implying that all interested states in a dispute must consent
to dispute resolution before the I.C.J. can review the case).
102

See id. para. 35 (refusing to entertain jurisdiction over

Portugal and Australia where it needed to determine the
lawfulness of Indonesia’s actions without its consent).
103

See id. para. 24 (noting that the I.C.J. may not rule with

regard to states’ international responsibility where the ruling
affects the legal interests of the non-consenting states). Even
if Dominica seeks resolution of the Aves Island dispute under
I.C.J. review, Venezuela could argue its legal interests in Aves
Island form the subject matter of the dispute thereby precluding
compulsory arbitration without its consent. Id.
104

See Declarations and Statements, supra note 40 (reporting

that while Venezuela has not yet submitted to UNCLOS’ compulsory
provisions, it may ratify the convention at any time and specify
the forums for resolution of its disputes).
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105

See UNCLOS, supra note 41, art. 287, para. 1 (declaring

states are free to choose to accept the jurisdiction of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the I.C.J., or
other special arbitral tribunals to resolve their territorial
disputes when signing or ratifying UNCLOS).
106

Compare id. (empowering states such as Venezuela and Dominica

with the sovereign right to choose to accept UNCLOS’ compulsory
jurisdiction provisions), with I.C.J. Statute, supra note 66,
art. 36 (granting states a sovereign right to consent to its
compulsory jurisdiction).
107

See U.N. Charter art. 55 (indicating that states’ right to

self-determination encourages international stability and wellbeing).
108

C.f. Port. v. Austl., 1995 I.C.J. para. 34 (correlating a

violation of state sovereignty with a violation of states’ right
to self-determination).
109

See U.N. Charter art. 55 (highlighting that states enjoy a

right to self-determination in “conditions of economic and
social progress and development . . . .”).
110

See id. art. 2, para. 4 (empowering U.N. member states to act

to further their economic and political interests).
111

See id. art. 56 (noting that U.N. members should take action

to further their right to self-determination under Article 55).
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112

See Islas o Dependencias Federales,

http://espanol.geocities.com/josegarmo/islas.html (last visited
Mar. 4, 2006) (attributing the Island’s increasing tourism to
its many beaches and natural attractions).
113

See UNCLOS, supra note 41, arts. 3, 57, 76 (setting forth

that member states’ territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf
are measured from their coastal baselines).
114

See Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connection, supra note 25

(observing that access to the Caribbean maritime territory in
dispute will grant states the exclusive right to explore and
exploit its significant natural resources).
115

See UNCLOS, supra note 41, art. 57 (providing UNCLOS member

states with an EEZ up to 200 nm from their coastal baselines).
In their EEZ, states have sovereign rights to explore, exploit,
conserve and manage natural resources. Id. art. 56.
116

See Cassese, supra note 2, at 89 (positing that self-

determination in fact obligates states to take action in the
best interest of their citizens).
117

See U.N. Charter art. 33 (granting states the “choice” of

enumerated dispute resolution methods to employ).
118

See generally East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90

(June 30) (considering Indonesia’s sovereign right to consent to
dispute resolution as an interested third-party).
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119

See id. para. 34 (explaining that because the East Timor

dispute implicated Indonesia’s rights and obligations, Indonesia
enjoyed the right to self-determination).
120

See U.N. Charter art. 55 (vesting Venezuela and Dominica, as

U.N. member states, with the right to determine a method of
dispute resolution that will best resolve their dispute).
121

See id. art. 33 (vesting U.N. members a choice of

internationally accepted methods of dispute resolution).
122

See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 101 (conceding that party

autonomy and flexibility are integral to effective dispute
settlement). But see id. at 89 (suggesting the U.N. should
deprive states flexibility in resolving their territorial
boundary disputes by implementing compulsory arbitration).
123

See U.N. Charter art. 55 (emphasizing all states should

recognize the right of U.N. member states to selfdetermination).
124

Compare Infoplease Venezuela, supra note 31 (reporting

Venezuela had a gross domestic product in 2004 of $145.2
billion), with Infoplease Daily Almanac, Dominica,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107471.html (last visited Mar.
5, 2006) (reporting that Dominica only approximates a gross
domestic product of $384 million).
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125

See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (noting that formal dispute

resolution is less important for larger, more powerful states
because they may utilize their economic resources to apply
pressure to smaller and weaker nations).
126

See id. (implying that economically powerful nations may not

even need to engage in formal dispute resolution).
127

See id. at 99-100 (noting smaller and more economically weak

states may seek to employ means of dispute resolution that will
place them on equal footing with more economically powerful
states).
128

See Peter, supra note 23, at 87 (conveying that impartial

procedures and arbiter neutrality are two of arbitration’s main
advantages). But see id. at 86-87 (attributing the costly
procedures of international arbitration to the arbitral bodies’
required opinion).
129

See id. at 84 (noting autonomy and flexibility of procedures

are two of mediation’s advantages). Dominica, for example, may
wish to specify time and date restrictions, facilitator rights
and duties, and various enforcement provisions in an agreement
with Venezuela. Id.
130

Compare U.N. Charter art. 33 (granting U.N. member states

flexibility by allowing them to choose their preferred method of
dispute settlement), with East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995
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I.C.J. 90, para. 34 (June 30) (emphasizing the right of states
to choose to engage in dispute resolution).
131

See discussion infra Part II.B (arguing that compulsory

jurisdiction will not effectively resolve the dispute over Aves
Island because it will encourage noncompliance and create
enforcement issues).
132

See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (discussing why losing

parties are unlikely to implement unfavorable judgments).
133

See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (averring that even though

Article 94 of the U.N. Charter empowers the Security Council to
take action to enforce the I.C.J.’s decisions, the Security
Council’s unwillingness to intervene makes the provision
essentially ineffective).
134

See Peters, supra note 10, at 2 (claiming the Friendly

Relations Doctrine imparts a general duty for all states to
cooperate in their interstate relations).
135

See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 33 (correlating the duty of U.N.

member states to attempt, in good faith, peaceful resolution of
their international disputes). States should attempt to maintain
friendly relations with other states as well. Id. arts. 55-56.
136

See Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connection, supra note 25

(reporting that although the disputed maritime territory
contains fishery resources, the vast amount of natural gas that
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lies in the seabed is actually driving the dispute; see also
Paulsson, supra note 1, at 123 (imparting that more than fifteen
percent of un-delimited maritime territory contains oil and
natural gas reserves).
137

See Peters, supra note 10, at 17 (conveying that state

cooperation stems from their initial consent to dispute
resolution).
138

See Nejib Jebril, Note and Comment, The Binding Dilemma: From

Bakassi to Badme – Making States Comply with Territorial
Decisions of International Judicial Bodies, 19 Am. U. Int’l L.
Rev. 633, 635 (attributing Nigeria’s noncompliance with the
I.C.J.’s grant of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon to Nigeria’s
failure to consent to resolution of the dispute). This case
exemplifies the I.C.J’s inability to enforce decisions. Id. at
636, 645.
139

See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (remarking that no method of

dispute resolution may prove effective where states are
disinclined to cooperate); c.f. Bakassi, supra note 70
(commenting that although Nigeria did not openly reject the
I.C.J.’s judgment, it failed to comply with the I.C.J.’s
decision and called for more negotiations with Cameroon because
it claimed that it did not accept the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction).
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140

See Declarations and Statements, supra note 40 (iterating

that Venezuela has not signed, ratified, or acceded to the
compulsory provisions of UNCLOS).
141

See Bakassi, supra note 70 (reporting that Nigeria refused to

withdraw its military from the Bakassi Peninsula after the
I.C.J. granted its sovereignty to Cameroon).
142

See Jack J. Coe, Jr., The Serviceable Texts of International

Commercial Arbitration: An Embarrassment of Riches, 10
Willamette J. Int’l L. & Disp. Resol. 143, 145 (2002) (noting
that contractual enforcement may affect party compliance).
143

See Peters, supra note 10, at 17 (theorizing that consent to

dispute resolution is crucial to effective settlement of states’
disputes).
144

See Jibril, supra note 138, at 650-51 (commenting on

international bodies’ lack of enforcement power when states
draft weak arbitration agreements).
145

See IRINNEWS.ORG, supra note 28 (indicating that Nigeria has

not recognized or complied with the I.C.J.’s decision).
146

See U.N. Charter art. 94 (granting states the right to seek

recourse and enforcement of the I.C.J.’s decisions through the
U.N. Security Council). The U.N. Security Council may enforce
I.C.J. decisions through military force if necessary. Id. art.
26.
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147

See International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing

as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court [hereinafter I.C.J.
Declarations], http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm
(last visited Mar. 5, 2006) (reporting that Venezuela and
Dominica have not yet accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
provisions of the I.C.J.).
148

See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 34

(June 30) (reiterating that the I.C.J. may only hear cases in
which states consent to its jurisdiction).
149

See Jibril, supra note 138, at 659 (conveying one reason the

I.C.J.’s decisions are vulnerable to enforcement inability is
due to states’ amicable political connections with the Security
Council).
150

See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 (setting forth: “If any

party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon
it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may
have recourse to the Security Council . . . .”).
151

See Ifesi, supra note 75 (recanting that even though the

I.C.J.’s 2002 decision had “binding” effect, Cameroon and
Nigeria set up a commission to negotiate their interests
further).
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152

See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 (empowering the U.N.

Security Council to “make recommendations or decide upon
measures” that it should take to enforce I.C.J. judgments).
153

See Jibril, supra note 138, at 659 (discussing the U.N.

Security Council’s hesitancy to intervene in disputes between
member states); see also Ibrahim J. Gassama, World Order in the
Post-Cold War Era: The Relevance and Role of the United Nations
After Fifty Years, 20 Brook. J. Int’l L. 255, 266-67 (1994)
(remarking the U.N. Security Council requires a substantial
amount of time to organize military intervention).
154

See Infoplease Venezuela, supra note 31 (conveying that

Venezuela maintains large reserves of petroleum and iron ore).
155

See Caricom, Caribbean Community Secretariat: The Caricom

Single Market Economy,
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/single_market_index.jsp
?menu=csme (last visited Mar. 5, 2006) (emphasizing a major goal
of the Caribbean Single Market Economy is to increase intraregional movement of resources between Caribbean States).
156

See I.C.J. Declarations, supra note 140 (pointing out that

since the I.C.J.’s formation in 1945, Venezuela has not accepted
its compulsory jurisdiction).
157

See discussion infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2 (arguing compulsory

arbitration creates inefficiencies for both international
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dispute resolution bodies and disputing states such as Venezuela
and Dominica).
158

See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (claiming that mandatory

arbitration will create inefficiency in the hierarchy of
acceptable dispute resolution mechanisms set forth in Article 33
of the U.N. Charter).
159

See discussion infra Part II.C.2 (suggesting that states such

as Venezuela and Dominica will lose the benefits and
efficiencies of regional dispute settlement mechanisms).
160

See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (implying resolution of

disputes through bilateral negotiations or regional settlement
potentially decreases the number of disputes that U.N. member
states submit to the I.C.J. for review).
161

See id. (intimating states should only resort to I.C.J.

adjudication where bilateral dispute resolution fails to resolve
their dispute).
162

See Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria

(Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 94, para. 66-67 (June 11)
(Preliminary Objections) (discussing how regional mechanisms
such as the Lake Chad Commission may increase dispute
resolution’s efficacy and efficiency where disputes involve
facts specific to their region).
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163

See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (suggesting arbitration

subject to I.C.J. review encourages states to bypass bilateral
negotiations and regional settlement mechanisms).
164

See Charter of the Organization of American States art. 85,

December 13, 1951, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (providing the Permanent
Council “shall assist the parties and recommend the procedures
it considers suitable for peaceful settlement of the dispute . .
. .”), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/oascharter.html#ch12 (last
visited Mar. 5, 2006).
165

See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (assuming, falsely, that the

I.C.J.’s review of all territorial disputes adds effectiveness
and efficiency to dispute resolution because all territorial
disputes involve the same principles). But see Paulsson, supra
note 1, at 126 (noting that the application of uniform
principles to disputes which involve different, case-specific
facts will not effectively resolve all boundary disputes).
166

See generally U.N. Charter arts. 52-54 (providing U.N. member

states the opportunity to engage in dispute resolution within
regional bodies).
167

See Cameroon v. Nig., 1998 I.C.J. paras. 66-67 (noting the

Lake Chad Commission, a regional settlement body, appropriately
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hears and decides issues of international peace and security
specific to its region).
168

See U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 2 (obliging U.N. members to

attempt resolution of their disputes through regional settlement
mechanisms before submitting their disputes to the U.N. for
resolution).
169

See id. para. 1 (emphasizing that certain disputes between

U.N. member states are best resolved through regional
mechanisms).
170

See USAID Supports Alternative Dispute Resolution in Latin

America and the Caribbean,
www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/pdf/dg_conflict.
pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2006) (indicating the use of experts
during mediation increases the states’ productivity during the
settlement process).
171

See Symposium, International Rule of Law, A.B.A., Latin

America & Caribbean Law Initiative Council (Nov. 9-10, 2005),
http://www.rolsymposium.org/lalic.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2006) (noting mediation may strengthen relations between
neighbor states and aid the development of states’ individual
governments).
172

See World Bank Group: Legal and Judicial Reform, Alternative

Dispute Resolution,
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http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/institutions_adr.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2006) (stating additionally that effective
dispute settlement will reduce caseloads that international
bodies must review).
173

See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B (advocating that Med-

Arb is a more effective and efficient method of dispute
resolution for territorial boundary disputes than is compulsory
arbitration).
174

See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B (suggesting that

states which engage in Med-Arb to resolve their territorial
boundary disputes are more likely to reach and comply with a
mutually beneficial agreement).
175

See discussion infra Part III.B (proposing that Venezuela and

Dominica may capitalize on the benefits of both mediation and
arbitration if they employ Med-Arb during their dispute
settlement).
176

C.f. Int’l Bus. Mach., Corp. v. Fujitsu, Ltd., 4 Am. Arb.

Ass’n No. 13T-117-0636-85 (1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs.)
(discussing how I.B.M. and Fujitsu made the resolution of their
dispute more effective by engaging in Med-Arb).
177

See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 33 (obliging U.N. member states to

attempt to resolve their international disputes in good faith).
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178

See De Vera, supra note 56, at 152 (implying that parties

that reach agreement through mediation are more likely to
resolve their dispute definitively and comply with the
agreement).
179

See Peter, supra note 23, at 106-14 (discussing how Med-Arb

effectively resolves international disputes in China, Germany,
and Switzerland).
180

See De Vera, supra note 56, at 153 (observing the arbitration

phase of Med-Arb requires states to consent to settlement).
181

See Peter, supra note 23, at 103 (recanting that I.B.M. and

Fujitsu documented their consent to be bound by Med-Arb’s
subsequent processes in an agreement they formed during the
initial phase of Med-Arb).
182

See id. at 103-04 (commenting that the parties initial

framework agreement encompassed the details of the parties’
future negotiations, mediation, arbitration, negotiated rulemaking and other various dispute resolution procedures).
183

Cf. id. (noting that Med-Arb facilitated various agreements

which made the rest of the parties’ dispute resolution process
more effective).
184

See De Vera, supra note 56, at 156 (adding that even partial

agreements are beneficial because they allow the parties to
resolve certain factual issues).
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185

See Peters, supra note 10, at 26-27 (emphasizing that

cooperation is integral to effective enforcement of decisions).
186

See Peter, supra note 23, at 105 (suggesting that states may

increase the effectiveness of their dispute settlement process
by employing Med-Arb because it will allow them to establish a
relationship for future cooperation).
187

See id. at 106 (suggesting parties that reach an agreement

during Med-Arb’s mediation phase increase the likelihood that
Med-Arb will effectively settle their dispute).
188

See Peters, supra note 10, at 6-7 (theorizing that methods of

dispute resolution which avoid a “winner-takes-all solution” but
reaches a consensual agreement are more effective and likely to
encourage compliance). Because Med-Arb is consistent with
Venezuela’s and Dominica’s sovereignty and will foster a
mutually beneficial agreement, Venezuela and Dominica will
likely comply with any resulting award. Id.
189

See generally Int’l Bus. Mach., Corp. v. Fujitsu, Ltd., 4 Am.

Arb. Ass’n No. 13T-117-0636-85 (1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs.)
(allowing I.B.M. and Fujitsu to autonomously set the procedures
of mediation and arbitration during their dispute settlement).
190

C.f. id. at 29, n.3 (noting that both I.B.M. and Fujitsu

agreed to abide by the arbitral rules of the American
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Arbitration Association). Such agreement made their dispute
resolution process more effective. Id.
191

See De Vera, supra note 56, at 161 (noting that Med-Arb

awards vest “the settlement reached by parties” with legal
effect). Similarly, Venezuela and Dominica may agree for a MedArb award to have binding effect on both states. Id.
192

See New York Convention, supra note 84, art. 1 (granting

signatories the right to seek enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards in host countries). The enforcing court may not, however,
impose “more onerous conditions or higher fees” than that
imposed for domestic awards. Id. art. 3.
193

See Katz, supra note 55, at 111 (stating that international

dispute resolution encourages effective settlement and
compliance because it causes parties to trust the impartiality
of its awards).
194

See De Vera, supra note 56, at 155 (relating Med-Arb’s

mediation phase may increase the efficiency of dispute
resolution by saving parties time and expenses). But see id.
(considering that cultural differences may undermine the
efficiency of Med-Arb).
195

See Peter, supra note 23, at 105 (indicating that the

mediator’s ability to tailor Med-Arb’s subsequent arbitration
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phase is one of Med-Arb’s major procedural advantages in terms
of efficiency).
196

See id. at 104 (suggesting that I.B.M. and Fujitsu had

resources sufficient to continue their settlement procedures for
many years).
197

See id. at 83-84 (positing that states may increase the

efficiency of their dispute resolution procedures by employing
Med-Arb); see also De Vera, supra note 56, at 154-55 (remarking
that Med-Arb allows states to obtain settlement of their dispute
both quickly and easily).
198

See Peter, supra note 23, at 106 (implying that the time

necessary to allocate the fault of disputing parties decreases
the efficiency of dispute resolution).
199

See De Vera, supra note 56, at 156-57 (averring that parties

that reach agreement during Med-Arb’s initial phase
significantly increase the efficiency of the subsequent
arbitration phase by resolving preliminary, factual issues).
200

See Peter, supra note 23, at 91 (discussing the opportunity

for parties to engage in a modified version of Med-Arb where
they question the mediator’s validity as an arbiter).
201

See id. at 105-06 (discussing how the third-party mediator’s

transition to arbiter increases Med-Arb’s efficiency by allowing
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the arbiter to focus on the goals of settlement rather than the
parties’ entitlements).
202

See id. at 106 (noting the mediator’s deeper understanding of

the dispute makes the arbitration phase more efficient because
the arbiter bases a decision on broader comprehension of the
dispute).
203

See De Vera, supra note 56, at 156-57 (asserting the time and

discovery expenses that the third-party facilitator saves during
Med-Arb translates directly into a more efficient dispute
settlement process for the parties employing Med-Arb).
204

See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 122 (implying the objective of

international law is to resolve disputes before they escalate to
armed conflict; thereby furthering international peace and
security).
205

See supra Part I.B (discussing the internationally accepted

means of dispute resolution set forth in the U.N. Charter).
206

See supra Part II.A (arguing the U.N. should not subject the

Aves Island dispute to compulsory jurisdiction because it
violates their state sovereignty and right to self-determination
under Articles 2 and 55 of the U.N. Charter).
207

See supra Parts II.B, II.C (claiming a requirement that

Venezuela and Dominica engage in compulsory arbitration may lead
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to noncompliance, enforcement problems, and inefficiencies in
their dispute resolution process).
208

See supra Parts III.A, III.B (suggesting Venezuela and

Dominica should engage in Med-Arb to resolve their dispute over
Aves Island because it will add efficacy and efficiency to their
dispute resolution process).
209

See supra Parts III.A, III.B (predicting that Med-Arb will

make Venezuela’s and Dominica’s dispute resolution more
effective and efficient because it will encourage both states to
cooperate during settlement, increase compliance with a
resulting award, reduce costs and time requirements, and reduce
the number of issues and/or disputes the I.C.J. must review).
210

See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 87-88 (noting dispute

resolution is effective if it prevents states from resorting to
force to resolve there dispute thereby contributing to
international peace and security).

73

